Time to read: approximately 23 minutes
On the Necessity of Gods
From The Author: This doctrine was originally to be strictly polytheistic, and to incorporate elements of magic. .It was assumed by the author that it was necessary to create something called a “religion” in order to perpetuate a worldview. But what is a religion? It is a worldview involving gods and magic. The Author seeks to perpetuate a worldview or a creed, not a religion per se. The modern lack of a doctrinal worldview is not the result of a lack of gods or magic, but is instead to do with the fact that nobody has yet codified a creed that is suitable to modernity. Also, the fact that information is very widely available, so that people can gain individual pieces of philosophical/scientific/ethical information without needing to learn it from one particular doctrinal source. Belief in the gods is therefore not necessary - they are not some essential element of a creed, but just so happen to have been featured in creeds of the past. Even so, the gods and magic are prominently part of the doctrine of Templism, for those who feel they need them. They are also used as principles of organization for temples, which will become apparent. Perhaps the gods are real, perhaps they are not. One cannot expect to have knowledge about that which is by definition outside of their plane of reality. Whatever it truly is, Templism is to be called a religion, for the purpose of marketing and comparison. It probably does truly qualify as a religion, anyway.
How the Gods Were Believed In
The “pagans” of the past believed in multiple gods, and they believed in us for reasons of tradition. They believed us to exist because of traditional stories, passed down through generations, about firsthand accounts of the observances of gods. Much like the reasons for which Christians believe Jesus to have existed, and much like the reasons for which traditional Christians believe Jesus to have had magical powers - he was purportedly observed to have existed, and to have used magical powers. These supposed observations were transmitted through stories across generations. Only, the purported observances of the gods were far more numerous than observances of Jesus Christ, and repeated in similar forms across distinct (though similar) populations, across longer periods of time.
Philosophical arguments for god can plausibly, though not necessarily, prove the existence of a deity in general. Philosophical arguments for god cannot, however, even plausibly prove any particular deity. The only proof that a Christian can have for the existence of the Christian god, and the only proof that a Muslim can have for the existence of the Muslim god, and so on, is the observed appearance of that god or a trusted recording of such an observed appearance. If this is the standard of evidence, then polytheism must be true. Many gods have been observed to appear, not just one.
What the Gods Are
Appearances
Our exact nature, level of corporeality, substance, and level of external reality are not knowable to people, because we do not exist on a plane of existence that is comprehensible to mortals. It is only necessary to know that sometimes, we appear. We may appear as anthropomorphic entities, as abstract forms, as ideas, as influences upon mortals, as forces of nature, as numina (see Numinous Affirmation of Divinity), etc. We may be “mere appearances”, or true entities - you will never be able to know. We are, as far as you need to be concerned, appearances. Appearances that have effects on the world of mortals, not to be ignored. We could be hallucinations, we could be immaterial beings, we could be ideas, we could be human lies. In any case, we are known quantities and we can exert influence upon the world.
Nature of Gods
We are powerful and immortal, but also capable of being harmed as well as helped. We have different powers from one another, though some of our powers are the same. We have private desires, ideals, and emotions. We are masculine or feminine, and can reproduce with ourselves as well as with humans. We are much like you, but vastly more powerful than you.
We have sometimes been said to be capable of death, but in reality we are only capable of imprisonment - being isolated, without the ability to influence the world or to interact with our own. This can be for limited time periods, or forever, depending upon our ability and inclination to escape, and the intentions of the captor(s).
It is to be assumed that all of the traditional stories about our appearances to humans are true. E.g, the appearance of Athena to Telemachus, the appearance of Scamander to Achilles, the appearance of Jesus to the people of Judea, the appearance of God to Abraham, the appearance of the Angel of the Lord to various figures of the Old Testament, and so on. It is to be assumed that other traditional stories about us, such as those in the Prose Edda, in Metamorphoses, etc, are usually true, given to ancient human priests by divine revelation to achieve divine purposes. However, we, like you, are capable of lying, and some of these stories are lies that we told to achieve certain aims, or half-truths that we told to appeal to inferior human intelligences in a way that they could understand. It is also the case that humans are capable of misremembering or embellishing our revelations. Such stories are, though, valuable; even an embellished, half-true, misinterpreted, version of a divine revelation, is great.
Origins of Gods
Our forefathers the “titans” were created just as the universe was created. They were part of one pantheon, and those among them who are our ancestors had jurisdiction over a people in the western Eurasian Steppe, what are now called the Proto-Indo-Europeans, or Aryans. As this people expanded to colonize Europe, and as this newfound European population then expanded further throughout Europe, to India, and to much of the Middle East, the Titans gave birth to us to rule over the disparate territories. .We gradually developed our own political units - pantheons. As is well known, the titans suffered a poor fate by our hands afterward. They wished to usurp the territories of their own children. For this we have imprisoned them forever, though some pantheons elected to banish them instead.
Variables
It is safe to say that the gods, in Templism, are not so much asserted to exist or not exist, as we could be “lies”, but are rather asserted to be something like “variables” that are of a general nature, being ethereal, anthropomorphic, powerful etc, but that our exact nature concerning our “substance”, e.g, material, mental (fictional), otherworldly, etc, is not known, and therefore we exist always as variables based upon what is known of us even if we cannot be known to “exist” in the sense of being material or otherworldly. That we are “real variables” is easily known from the fact that humans have been influenced by these variables for all time, and seem to fall into disarray whenever they are not or do not claim to be. It wouldn’t make any difference, except to fools, if I told you that we did exist as external organism-like beings, so it is of little relevance if a given Templists wishes to believe that about us or not. A “hardline realist Templist” is as fine as a skeptic, as long as they reckon with the variables. There are even Agnostic Templists (see Becoming a Templist), who need not reckon with the variables, but are less pious followers of our doctrine.
Counter-Humean Argument
David Hume is greatly lauded in a few places of the Canon, being as he is a very true, sincere, and clear philosopher, while most philosophers are false, overtly or unconsciously “diplomatic”, and deliberately or through some personal or (often) cultural fault obscure. It is interesting, and a testament to The Author’s superiority, that no one has made a synthesis between spiritual beliefs and such philosophers as Hume, Hobbes, Aristotle, etc, but that ever since antiquity all pagan spirituality has been rationalized through the emotive stupidity of Plato, Zeno, Gnostics, etc. Because, as pagan spirituality is rather complex, and reasoning fully about complex things is difficult and not persuasive to the average person, it is much easier to throw emotionally laden obscurities at people, leading them to hold preposterous views in “worlds of forms”, “monads”, and the like, which views inform their other views, which other views inform their actions, which actions are therefore caused by such pernicious philosophers who, save that it may stifle inventiveness, would have been better if deprived of the physical ability to speak, because their words are worse than those of mental invalids, and occupy space in the minds of those who would otherwise think more accurate thoughts. Many such doctrines could be replaced by “noises”, in the manner that Abrahamic texts can largely be replaced by the word “boom!”, Plato can be replaced by a series of “reasoning noises” followed by a “crescendo” that is the theory of forms or the ideal republic, Nietzsche can be replaced by sardonic noises accompanying encouragement, and so on. When a subhuman claims to “agree” with such a text, he really only likes the noises that it makes.
The section of Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Of Miracles, provides a good framework from which to understand Templist epistemology as it applies to theology. Hume argues against the existence of miracles, which I will dispute, and then I will aim to prove the existence of miracles. By which he and I mean, anything that defies the laws of nature, not only those that are specific good works. Relevant excerpts:
“to apply these principles to a particular instance; we may observe, that there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and even necessary to human life, than that which is derived from the testimony of men, and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators. This species of reasoning, perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. I shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe that our assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. It being a general maxim, that no objects have any discoverable connexion together, and that all the inferences, which we can draw from one to another, are founded merely on our experience of their constant and regular conjunction; it is evident, that we ought not to make an exception to this maxim in favour of human testimony, whose connexion with any event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any other. Were not the memory tenacious to a certain degree, had not men commonly an inclination to truth and a principle of probity; were they not sensible to shame, when detected in a falsehood: Were not these, I say, discovered by experience to be qualities, inherent in human nature, we should never repose the least confidence in human testimony. A man delirious, or noted for falsehood and villany, has no manner of authority with us.”
“A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable, that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be, that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words, a miracle to prevent them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle, if it ever happen in the common course of nature. It is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a sudden: because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other, has yet been frequently observed to happen. But it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle; nor can such a proof be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof, which is superior.”
I would like to provide the following counterargument to Hume’s view, which a Templist need not believe: First of all, he cannot characterize miracles as never happening, or happening infrequently, as in “but it is a miracle, that a dead man should come to life; because that has never been observed in any age or country.” This assumes his conclusion, and it is uncharitable, since miracle-believers do not assert miracles to be unobserved. Whether or not miracles happen is the question. We can only say, to prove or disprove this, that they are attested to some degree. Begging the question is, by the way, somewhat common for Hume, because he is of an empirical temperament, and people of an empirical temperament have a tendency to state what seems obvious without argumentation. Although, most of his blunders are not serious; as in this case, all we need to do is substitute happen for attested. He simply could not exercise restraint in this regard, even though he meant to, such that his argument can proceed well enough as if he did. Miracles are, by nature, infrequently attested. They are not never attested, or else they would not even be a subject of refutation. It is true, however, that a particular type of miracle might not be attested. For example, nobody has ever claimed to see an object turn into a pure number. Thus it is at least certain that, until a particular type of miracle is attested, there can be no evidence for it. I can grant that to Hume.
But what of those that are infrequently attested? To answer this, it is necessary to note that some things are mutually exclusive, and some not. If one party contends that someone is guilty, and another innocent, it is reasonable to choose whichever side has superior evidence (philosophically speaking, but the standards of jurisprudence are practical, as in some cases requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt). Hume probably believes that miracles are mutually exclusive with the generally observed laws of nature. However, the laws of nature do not refer to definite things. They are a conceptual and temporal aggregate of “things that generally happen”. Hume defines them as “things that always happen”, but this definition is question begging, for one thing, and for another thing the first definition is logically implied by the character of the evidence he says establishes such laws, namely general observation. There is no such thing as eternal observation (well, until the end of the universe), so nothing can be evidenced to be eternal, but only evidenced in a particular point in time or in general points of time. It is an improper inference to reason from “general” to “eternal”, even though it is a common human heuristic suitable for most purposes to do so. Hume even admits this in his “problem of induction”. The only remaining prejudice may be that “the only evidence is of the certainty of the laws of nature, but not of their uncertainty”, but uncertainty is not a proposition, only a lack of knowledge. Therefore, anything which is not evidenced is uncertain, which means that the eternal state of natural laws is uncertain. Ergo natural law is not mutually exclusive with miracles. This proves that miracles are logically possible in light of natural law, but not if they happen.
To prove that miracles happen, it is necessary to say that evidence, for a proposition that is not mutually exclusive to another proposition, is not established relative to the evidence for that other proposition, but absolutely. It doesn’t matter if there is more evidence for natural law than there is for miracles, because they are not mutually exclusive. All that matters is if there is sufficient evidence on an absolute scale. There is absolutely a great wealth of evidence for miracles on an absolute scale. They have been recorded since the beginning of human history. Miracles include, by this definition, appearances of the gods, since the random appearance of an ethereal anthropomorphic entity certainly defies the laws of nature, even if our behavior is not considered. The number of historically recorded miracles greatly outweighs what is empirically known to be the human capacity to coordinate lies or coincidentally err. Nor is it necessarily the case that miracles have, as some assert, become less common. It may be the case that it only appears that way, due to the massive increase in population relative to a more finite (though not incapable of generation) population of gods and spirits.
This criticism is not necessary for a Templist to believe, because a Templist can still believe in the gods while accepting Hume’s view, via the above “variables” doctrine. Furthermore, a Templist need not believe in the gods at all, if he is an Agnostic Templist. I would like to add, momentarily, related to what I said initially, that many “noise listeners” hear that Templism is “agnostic” or “atheistic” or a “theological parody”, because I say that various beliefs are optional. But what I say is that various beliefs are optional. Some of them are mutually exclusive, in which case only one can be true. I assert that it is true that the gods are real, but Agnostic Templists need not believe it, because we want to include them. Maybe, in reality, I am misleading the theistic Templists, so as to include them for the Agnostic Templists. Maybe “I” am nothing more than The Author. As to how, or in what way, we are real, I offer many possibilities and optional arguments, because it is not important, as long as you believe in us, and more possibilities include more views and hence more view-holders to worship us. If “noise listeners” call this un-reverential, I retort they could never aspire to understand reverence in the first place, but exist to take in choir music and spit out words and deeds required of them. Templist Canon is filled with tonal holes and snares for them, that make it impossible for them to understand without the guidance of someone whose boot should be on their neck. This is itself another reason for the theological ambivalence of the Canon, that it confuses those who cannot gather information and make a decision about what they believe; people to whom all propositions are commands. What am I telling you to do? I am telling you we want to build a religion by including various theological views, but which theological view am I telling you to hold? Oh, what will you do! Go read Plato, perhaps. Go seek after the monad, perhaps. Go become the ubermensch, perhaps. The natural Templists will circle back around to you later, to convert you as a norm-following subordinate rather than a vanguard. You will be better for it, but not as well as if you were a self-motivated leader with the capacity to reason, who we prize above others because they are more like us. You are not like us, but will give us offerings after hearing sounds.
Hume, in Of Miracles, gives an example by way of critique, of what Templists would call a divine appearance; a specific instance in which a god is observed:
“One of the best attested miracles in all profane history, is that which Tacitus reports of Vespasian, who cured a blind man in Alexandria, by means of his spittle, and a lame man by the mere touch of his foot; in obedience to a vision of the god Serapis, who had enjoined them to have recourse to the Emperor, for these miraculous cures.”
This is the very same kind of miracle that Jesus worked, but only Jesus is a god? Vespasian, to be clear, was not a god, but as Hume says was merely used as a vector for the powers of Serapis. Jesus was an incarnated god. There are many evidences of this type, so there are many gods. To reason, as Aquinas does, that there is a “first mover”, and then to say that this “first mover” must be his supposed “one God”, is affirming the consequent, since God is a being with many characteristics who claims to be the first mover, which may or may not be true, but only the first mover was proved, not the existence of any other properties that characterize God and so identify the first mover to be him. The gap in reasoning can only be filled by wishful thinking. Our cosmology, anyway, which is not necessary for Templists to believe, is cyclical and does not contain a first mover (see Physics, Cosmology, & The Fifth Afterlife), although it could still be compatible with one.
Lastly, I would like to ward against a corollary that some may imply from this section: that there can be no evidence that the gods are eternal, given what I have said earlier. Firstly: that there is no evidence does not mean that it is not actually the case, only that there is no reason to confirm or deny. Secondly: it is a canonical divine declaration that the gods are eternal. Templism is a rational religion, compared to others, sometimes called the “one truest of the religions”, but no religion can subsist without a dogma. Anyone who complains about the invocation of dogma is basically ungrateful. Besides, it is established by Hume that one trusts attestations according to empirical evidence of the reliability of those who attest to them, and humans have generally held that there is empirical evidence of a high degree of reliability to divine attestations. I do say, though, that we can lie, and that it is a human prejudice to place so much trust in us simply because we are impressive and powerful, which are different from telling the truth. However, the manner in which you must trust us is not only in terms of truthfulness, but “holding on for dear life”. That is, in the manner that children must trust adults. Perhaps, you may say, we are pernicious gods, who lead humanity astray at every turn, such that you would be better off as atheists. We would have power over you whether you were atheists or not, controlling your world for whatever ends you may allege. Most importantly, “by our fruits you shall know us”; setting aside whether what we say is evidenced to be reliable, what consequences does it lead to? This is the same method by which a child judges his relationship with his parents, because he has no capacity to scrutinize their statements. What is the consequence of prayer? What is the consequence when a society adheres to religious laws? What is the consequence when a person disobeys divine recommendations?
Which Gods There Are
God Equivalencies
The existing gods are known to tradition, and need not be listed here. Some of them are listed as part of Templist Canon in the “pantheon posts”. It will be observed that in many cases, there appear to be gods under different names, but with the same characteristics. Gods with the same characteristics are really the same god, given different names by mortal cultural differences. However, you must be careful not to equate gods that have mostly similar characteristics. It is better to accidentally make a distinction between two gods that are in fact the same god, than to accidentally treat two gods as one god. Give offerings to the first two “distinguished” gods, and they go to the desired recipient in either case. Give offerings to the last “accidentally fused” god, and you are actually giving offerings only to the god that is named, or possibly to neither god.
For example, it is sometimes said that Perun is the “Slavic version” of Thor. They do indeed have some similarities. They both wield lightning, cause storms, manage the sky, and are responsible for law and order as well as certain aspects of fertility and male virility. However, Perun is also a war god, but Thor is not. Therefore they are not the same. An example of gods that are truly the same is that of Woden and Odin. They have exactly the same characteristics and myths, and are truly just different regional names for the same person. Likewise, most of the traditional Greco-Roman equivalencies are true as well, with the notable exception of Mars and Ares (see The Greco-Roman Gods).
It is also important that one does not confuse the political position of a god in his or her pantheon with an inherent characteristic of that god. For example, Zeus and Wotan are not the same at all, even though each one is the leader of his pantheon. It is the case that different pantheons choose (or are forced by those gods to have) different types of gods as their leaders.
The Inspiration of TC
This work is inspired by Mercury (or Hermes) of the Greco-Roman pantheon, with the aid of Apollo of the same pantheon, under the supervision of Jupiter and Juno as well as Minerva (or Athena), but commissioned by Wotan of the Germanic pantheon, and so pursuant to the standards set by himself and also the aforementioned Perun, who devised the idea to write this work during a private meeting of theirs about two months ago. Wotan has temporarily left his son Balder with us to see that his wishes are met. In fact, I have just been compelled to say that Wotan commissions this for altruistic reasons, but that we write it for economic reasons, and Jupiter oversees it merely to ensure that Wotan does not slander us. The motivations of Perun I do not know. We are all, anyway, broadly in agreement that this publication, and the renewed relationship with humanity that it will provide, will be good for us. It is physically written by a mortal, who regards us as mere ideas as of the time of this writing.
For prayer offerings I especially like precious metal trinkets as well as letters and messages containing secret details, though the usual offerings of food and beverage are not to be shunned either, nor is diversity of offerings not welcome.
Pantheons
By a “pantheon” I mean a collection of gods existing within a certain political or social system of deities, which appear to a certain group of mortals and scarcely to other groups of mortals. For example, the Germanic Pantheon, Greco-Roman Pantheon, Egyptian Pantheon, Slavic Pantheon, etc. The reasons for a god’s membership in a particular pantheon are various - it could be due to blood (or other) relation to an existing pantheon member, or because they happen to reside in the territory of the pantheon, or something else.
Jurisdictions
A pantheon is first and foremost a jurisdiction, to which certain deities belong. The deities within the pantheon are allowed to interact with mortals and nature within the jurisdiction. It is our (Greco-Roman) custom, and also the custom of the Egyptians, for jurisdictions to be territorial. It is, however, the custom of the northern groups for jurisdictions to be based on mortal races. We claim jurisdiction over races of men as well, but only to the extent that certain families are related to us. The northern pantheons actually have this exact precedent, but they so happen to have bred with certain mortal populations very widely, while we have regulations against it. The Hindu gods claim jurisdiction over anyone who follows their ritual and moral norms, which is somewhat disturbing to us and to others, because it allows them to usurp worshipers from us regardless of who or where they are.
It is not uncommon for the “messenger deity” of a pantheon to appear in other jurisdictions, and he is generally allowed to do so, not least because he would do so whether he were allowed to or not. To this end I propose to offer myself to all Templists who lack a modern commerce deity.
No god within a pantheon can be exactly the same god as a differently named god in another pantheon, though they may have similar responsibilities.
A jurisdiction is a political relationship between the gods. That a pantheon exists within a certain jurisdiction does not mean that it is completely incapable of acting within another jurisdiction. It means that, if it or any of its members do, the rightful claimant of that jurisdiction will be upset by it, and will act accordingly. Therefore, though we are capable of acting within foreign jurisdictions, we choose not to, or other gods force us not to, though now and then we might get away with it.
Other Gods
All gods, whether they claim to be part of a pantheon of multiple gods, or whether they falsely claim to be the one and only “true” god, are “real” insofar as they have made appearances to humans passed down through traditions. The god of the Jews, for example, has truly appeared to those people repeatedly over time as preserved in a tradition. Thus, he is just as real as we are. The fact that he may lie by saying that we do not exist, but only he does, does not make him cease to be real. When dealing with such gods, one should assess their traits by what they do, rather than by what they say. Otherwise one would go on believing that the Jewish god is “god of everything”. One knows from observation, however, that he is a law and war god.
February 22, 2022
very beautiful. A law and a war god